On July 20, 2025, Japanese voters went to the polls and awarded the far-right party Sanseitō with 14 seats in the upper house, a tremendous increase from its previous one seat. A right-wing populist party gaining national traction in a country often seen as resistant to populism took longer than expected by many Japan watchers. The Liberal Democratic Party, which had shifted to the right under Abe Shinzō, thereby catering to right-wing voter sentiment, played an important role in Japan’s alleged immunity to right-wing populism (cf. article by Schäfer 2022 in this journal). Similar to what has been observed in countries like Germany, far right populist parties in Japan initially found success in modest and underestimated ways within select elections and regions. Still, recent developments in Japan further demonstrate how populism serves as a flexible political platform, easily adopted and adapted, as exemplified by Sanseitō’s MAGA-inspired “Japanese First” politics, paving the way for potential national impact (cf. forthcoming article by Marcantuoni & Fahey in this series).
Sanseitō’s platform focuses on three main issues: the perceived threats from “globalist” elites (a term that gained popularity particularly at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic; cf. Poppe et al. 2023 and this article by Havenstein & Schäfer in our series), an “uncontrollable” influx of allegedly criminal foreigners, and a “corrupt” political establishment “burdening” young people with taxes. These narratives echo the themes of globalized populism, resembling the rhetoric of Germany’s right-wing party leader Alice Weidel or U.S. President Donald Trump. Like many populist agendas, these issues are framed within a clear friend-enemy dichotomy, characterized by leveraging resentment against migrants or corrupt elites, perceived as threats to the “virtuous” people. The goal is to “reclaim” the nation from these perceived threats. Moreover, the notion that foreigners are taking something away from the Japanese, a very common right-wing populist trope, was previously championed by right-wing extremist groups like Zaitokukai in Japan, a name that can be literally translated as the ‘Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi (ethnic Koreans who reside in Japan).’ Kamiya Sōhei, Sanseitō’s leader, openly admits to borrowing this strategy from Trump and other right-wing populists.
Experience from other countries where right-wing populism has become entrenched shows that while such parties may rise and fall or even disappear, the ideology often persists. This is because the populist agenda aims to reshape political discourse, influence political communication, and undermine democratic institutions through strategic attacks. Their ultimate objective is to normalize distrust in democratic norms and institutions, causing long-term damage that cannot be easily reversed, even if the party loses influence or dissolves.
Another characteristic of right-wing populism is the strategic use of social media. Social media effectively bypasses traditional channels, often labeled as “fake-news” mainstream media, and allows direct engagement with “the people.” It exacerbates societal polarization, stirring resentment and offering simplistic solutions to complex issues, such as Japan’s aging population. Additionally, social media’s algorithmic attention economy favors the most sensational or extreme voices, further amplifying what might have once been marginalized in public discourse. However, it is important to note that most right-wing populists do not just know how to use social media, they are natives to the platforms; it is their natural habitat, their ecosystem. Therefore, it is from these platforms that they have created their base, it is their constituency.
In Japan, the rise of right-wing populist parties did not emerge in isolation. The foundation for this phenomenon was laid out on platforms frequented by the netto uyoku (Japan’s online far-right), such as 2chan/ 5chan and the Yahoo news comment sections. The anti-foreigner sentiment rampant on these platforms has gradually infiltrated mainstream social media platforms, particularly X/Twitter. This shift has also brought disinformation and conspiracy theories from the fringes of the internet into the public political sphere, aligning with the ascendance of right-wing populists. According to Kamiya himself, his support base was “accumulated on the internet,” where he posted provocative content under titles like “Was Hitler Really a Great Evil?” and “Behind the Scenes of the World Government.” In 2013, Kamiya launched a YouTube channel called “ChGrandStrategy,” promoting far-right ideologies, historical revisionism, and conspiracy theories. As of June 2023, the channel boasts 338,000 subscribers and over 3,000 videos. Furthermore, in 2019, Kamiya collaborated with conservative YouTuber KAZUYA and political analyst Yuya Watase to establish the “Political Party DIY” YouTube channel, which led to the party’s official formation in April 2020. But KAZUYA distanced himself from Sanseitō in less than a year, separating from the conspiracy theories propagated by Kamiya.
We can learn a considerable amount from the symbiotic relationship between social media and populism, a dynamic that extends beyond the mere proficiency of populists in using social media. Many contemporary right-wing populists are or have been influencers with vast followings. In Japan, this includes figures such as Hashimoto Tōru, Kamiya, or Hyakuta Naoki (who has gained popularity through his appearances on the Internet broadcasting channel DHC TV), a fellow right-wing politician whose newly established party, Nippon Hoshutō (Conservative Party of Japan), shares similar aspirations with Sanseitō, albeit with less success. Kamiya, in particular, could be labeled as a “conspiracy entrepreneur” (cf. the article by Havenstein & Schäfer in our series), who understands that disinformation serves a dual purpose: economically, as it generates monetizable online content, and politically, as it creates (a) discursive disruption through noise (referred to by former Trump advisor Steve Bannon as a “flood of bullshit”) and (b) assaults established systems and institutions vital for democratic societies, including political parties, science, or the legacy mass media. The relationship between platforms and populism is one of mutual amplification: populist political platforms thrive on resentment and disinformation, while online platforms cultivate environments ripe for conspiratorial and racist narratives.
Another significant threat posed by right-wing populism lies in its inclination towards disinformation and conspiracy theories that makes its proponents vulnerable to foreign influence from states that engage in interference as part of asymmetric propaganda warfare. In Japan, analyses indicate an intensifying connection between fringe politicians and Russia (cf. the article by Kalalshnikova & Schäfer in our series). In July 2025, allegations arose suggesting the party might have ties with Russia following Saya’s appearance on Sputnik News, a Russian state propaganda outlet, during her upper house election campaign. Kamiya denied any Russian affiliation, stating that the interview was approved by a “low-ranking staff member” without his consent. Consequently, Kamiya requested the resignation of the responsible individual. This is a typical defense strategy used by right-wing populist politicians, who often dismiss extreme views within their parties as either personal opinions or not reflective of official party policy. Nonetheless, the party’s perceived pro-Russian stance remained under scrutiny, particularly after Kamiya remarked that “Moscow should not bear full responsibility for the war in Ukraine.” In this regard, Japan appears to have aligned with the global trend of right-wing populism, closing ranks with authoritarian regimes.
One can conclude that right-wing platform populism is a versatile system that, once it has entered a nation’s political sphere, will subsist, even if parties such as Sanseitō were to vanish. Attempts by parties like the Happiness Realization Party or the Conservative Party of Japan to capitalize on the rise of right-wing populism in Japan exemplify this ongoing development. It is as if Pandora’s box has now been opened.
