Abstract: In late 2024, the declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk Yeol’s government shocked South Korea, provoking widespread protests and calls for impeachment. While the martial law lasted only a brief period, its aftermath catalyzed significant political and social unrest. A notable development was the increasing influence of the far-right, which gained traction through social media platforms and conspiracy theories. Simultaneously, a new political force emerged in the form of young women in their 20s and 30s, referred to as “2030 women.” These women, utilizing K-pop fandom culture, led innovative protests advocating for solidarity, gender equality, and progressive change. Their activism not only challenged entrenched conservative ideologies but also aligned with marginalized groups, reshaping the political landscape. This situation highlights the growing polarization within South Korean society, with a potential rise in far-right conservatism, but also opens up opportunities for a transformative shift led by the younger generation, promoting solidarity, inclusion, and equality in the political discourse.
Keywords: South Korea, Martial law, Democracy, Impeachment, Right wing, Women
Sudden and Shocking Martial Law
The declaration of martial law by Yoon Suk Yeol at the end of last year had a profound and unsettling impact on South Korean society. The term “martial law,” once relegated to history textbooks and academic debates, resurfaced in everyday life after 45 years, causing most Koreans to dismiss it as “fake news” when it first appeared on social media. For a nation that had long celebrated the myth of the “Miracle of the Han River”—a story of overcoming poverty, dictatorship, and cultural colonialism to achieve rapid economic growth, democratization, and a flourishing of popular culture—this moment exposed the underlying fractures in Korean society. It also shattered the collective pride of the nation, leaving deep emotional scars in its wake.
In the end, the martial law declared by the Yoon Suk Yeol government lasted only six hours, earning ridicule from the media as a “six-hour dream.” (Hwang 2025) However, the political, economic, and social repercussions of this event continue to unfold and the outcome remains uncertain. While many believe that President Yoon Suk Yeol will face impeachment for his unconstitutional martial law declaration, fierce legal battles are still underway, and public opinion shifts and polarizes with every passing moment. It also remains to be seen what kind of cultural politics will emerge from extreme polarization.
When protesters succeeded in neutralizing military efforts to block the National Assembly building, allowing the National Assembly to lift martial law, it appeared that the crisis had reached a somewhat anticlimactic conclusion. In the days that followed, public sentiment overwhelmingly called for the president’s impeachment, and both domestic and international media outlets praised Korea’s peaceful and creative protest culture, along with its “democratic resilience.” However, the impeachment vote, once assumed to be inevitable, barely passed after 11 days due to opposition from the ruling party. Now, with the Constitutional Court set to decide whether to uphold the impeachment, political conflict and social chaos continue to escalate. The drastic shift in the situation can largely be attributed to the right’s unabashed embrace of violent rhetoric, which has at times turned into violent action. Amidst this turmoil, the media began to express concerns about the “martial law bills flying into the Korean economy” (An 2024), as well as the rising “martial law impotence and insomnia” (Choi and Kim 2025).
The continued confusion surrounding this situation also stems from the unclear motives behind the declaration of martial law. Despite the effort of many politicians, media outlets, and citizens to unravel the “mystery of martial law” (Park 2024), nobody has provided a satisfactory explanation. President Yoon and the ruling party have tried to justify the declaration, claiming it was a response to the oppressive actions of the opposition party, which allegedly monopolized legislation and moved forward with the impeachment of government officials. However, this justification is more political rhetoric than a solid rationale, as few politicians fail to recognize that responding to the opposition party’s actions with martial law is an unconstitutional move that undermines democratic principles. Moreover, while the ruling party has attempted to bolster the legitimacy of martial law by spreading rumors about election fraud and foreign espionage, multiple investigations have thoroughly debunked their claims.
The current impeachment situation reveals at least three key phenomena related to “culture and power” in Korean society. First, the far-right, which has historically denied democracy and the rule of law, is reasserting and expanding its influence. Second, 2030 women (women in their 20s and 30s) have emerged as significant proponents of progressive ideology. Third, as Korean society becomes increasingly divided along partisan lines, the future of the strong sense of national community that has historically defined Korea remains uncertain. In the following sections, we will explore these three phenomena, focusing on historical and cultural divisions shaped by gender and generational differences. We will also examine how these divisions are influencing the ideological and political landscape of Korean society.
The Resurgence of the Anticommunist Generation and the Rise of the Far-Right
Even before the martial law declaration, political protests in South Korea often featured a far-right group collectively known as the “Taegeukgi Force” (a reference to the Korean flag) or the “Asphalt Right” (a reference to their tendency to hit the streets).1 This group, primarily made up of people who are in their mid-60s and older, male, Christian, from conservative regions, and lower-middle class, had long been viewed as marginal, clinging to outdated ideologies. This is because in the aftermath of the military dictatorship’s collapse and the rise of Kim Young-sam’s “civilian government” in the 1990s, conservative parties distanced themselves from extreme supporters to appeal to more moderate voters. However, the martial law declaration served as a wake-up call, showing that the far-right, which began to gain influence in the mid-2010s, has evolved into a faction that can no longer be ignored. In the two and a half years of Yoon’s presidency, they became empowered enough to spearhead large-scale rallies and impact opinion polls.
The far-right constructs “enemies”—such as groups that are sympathetic to North Korea and China, or labor unions that hinder the market economy—that they believe seek to destroy the modern nation-state established by conservatives, and in doing so position themselves as the “patriotic liberal right.” They consider factual accuracy or public opinion irrelevant; they focus solely on whether a narrative fits within their ideological framework. As a result they enthusiastically believe in and spread conspiracy theories, such as the idea that the left rigged the last legislative elections. Prominent conservative commentators, such as Cho Gap-je and Jeong Gyu-jae, have raised concerns about the irrational, even anti-rational mindset of the far-right, describing it with terms like “far-right cult,” “mental epidemic,” and “magical conspiracy theory” (Chang and Kim 2025).
Despite these concerns, the Yoon administration and ruling party leadership have not only failed to distance themselves from the far-right but have at times tacitly agreed with their claims. This has incited the far-right to violence of a kind not normally witnessed in Korea these days: notably, they vandalized a court after it issued an arrest warrant for Yoon. However, it is important to interpret their rise in the context of South Korea’s history and not just through a political lens. From the modern era to the present day, Korea has largely been governed by pro-Japanese factions maintaining their political powers from the colonial era, pro-American military forces during the Cold War, conservative Christian groups that fled North Korea, and capitalists. These factions strongly believe they are the ones who brought Korea to its status as an advanced nation, with opposition to communism seen as central to their “success.”
At the same time, this generation of conservatives has a strong sense of victimization, having felt politically marginalized and unfairly criticized when pro-democracy movements gained strength and progressive presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun came into power in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Anticommunism, once a pillar of right-wing ideology, was now perceived as a mask for dictatorship. Faced with the destruction of their ideological foundation and embarrassed by their new position as obstacles to democracy, they reconstructed their memories and reinterpreted their experiences. For example they began to accommodate, though reluctantly, the historical revaluation of Gwangju Uprising in 1980 as a democratization movement, not just a riot, to negotiate with getting empowered progressive camps (Lee 2011). Furthermore, apart from Kim Young-sam, all of the conservative presidents since the 1980s have either been impeached or arrested. This fact has fostered a widespread belief among elderly conservatives that progressives are aiming to dismantle liberal democracy. For this generation, the ideological divide is more than just political—it is deeply personal. And they have found a home in the far-right, thanks to the rise of social media.
YouTube in particular has played a decisive role in the process. Elderly conservatives consume information via select channels, internalizing far-right ideology and entering a virtual reality. During the martial law crisis, the website fed them “fake news” about the legitimacy of martial law and the illegitimacy of impeachment, leading some people to describe the situation as “the world’s first insurrection instigated by algorithm addiction” (Choe 2025). After his self-coup attempt failed, Yoon told his supporters to watch conservative YouTube channels rather than traditional media; other leaders of the ruling People Power Party are similarly thought to be living in this “Truman Show.”
Another significant socio-cultural shift related to the rise of far-right power in Korea is the conservatism of young men in their 20s and 30s, evinced by their increased presence at right-wing protests. The conservative ruling party has tapped into their resentment of feminism in order to garner their support. Although their sense of victimization isn’t supported by reality—the wage gap, male dominance of public positions, and patriarchal values are just a few examples of persistent gender inequality in Korea—there are deeper, more complex pressures at play. Young men, who have to serve in an intensely tough military only to compete in an equally tough job market afterward, fear being “wasted” in society (Bauman 2003). A shared antipathy toward progressive forces has led them to align with elderly men. As Judith Butler pointed out, Korean society is now facing the political phenomenon of a “new right-wing group targeting gender, projecting phantasms, and inciting fear and hatred” (Lee 2024).
2030 Women’s K-pop Light Sticks and Gift-Giving Movements
In the wake of Yoon’s martial law declaration, we could also witness a totally contrasting political phenomenon with the revitalization of right wing forces in Korean society. When protests erupted across South Korea right after the martial law declaration that called for his impeachment, what stood out the most were the large numbers of young women in their 20s and 30s, often referred to as “2030 women.” These women made up about 30% of the protesters, with some reports suggesting that up to 1-2 million people participated in rallies across key locations, including Yeouido, Gwanghwamun Square, and near the Constitutional Court. Even in 2008, a significant number of women with children—known as the “baby stroller brigades”—showed up at the “mad cow disease protests” against the importation of American beef, but their participation was largely viewed through the lens of maternal concerns rather than political interest or empowerment (Chae and Kim 2010).
The political activism of young women, however, has been gaining momentum for over a decade. A pivotal moment came in 2016, when the brutal murder of a woman at Gangnam subway station shocked the nation. This incident fueled a strong response from young women against male violence and misogyny. This, combined with rising awareness of digital sex crimes like “molka” (hidden camera incidents) and the “Nth Room” scandal (Kim 2025), contributed to a growing feminist movement that pushes back against South Korea’s patriarchal culture.
What is particularly notable about these recent protests is the innovative way young women have integrated South Korea’s vibrant K-pop fandom culture into their activism. Women in their 20s and 30s, previously thought to be detached from political issues other than women’s rights, have brought a fresh and creative energy to the protest scene. Drawing on their experiences as passionate K-pop fans, they have reshaped the landscape of protest. These women prefer to take over the political scene by engaging in “small but happy experiences” rather than painfully confronting heavy political issues as previous generations did (Hong 2024).
For example, in the protests sites, young women have been spotted singing medleys of popular K-pop songs, such as Girls’ Generation’s “Into the New World,” G-Dragon’s “Crooked,” and g.o.d’s “One Candle.” They wave flags adorned with images of their favorite idols, as well as humorous slogans like “Gathering of People Who Want to Do Nothing” or “Research Group on the Smell of Dog Paws.” Their chants echo the sentiment of “the freedom for fans to only worry about being fans (in a world without political turmoil),” emphasizing a political space controlled by ordinary people, not traditional political groups (Hong 2024, Jang 2024).
Protestors actively exchange information via social media platforms like Instagram and X and wave “light sticks,” the glowing plastic sticks used at K-pop concerts, turning protest nights into colorful displays of solidarity. This new form of protest has been described as a powerful message, with scholars such as Judith Butler noting that it sends a clear political statement: “Korean democracy is still strong enough to resist authoritarianism and fascism” (Lee 2024).
The 2030 women’s protest culture is also fostering solidarity across generations. Protesters in their 20s and 30s are finding common ground with the generation that struggled against the military dictatorship, which consists of people (particularly men) now in their 40s and 60s. Music has been a unifying force, with folk songs from the pro-democracy protests of the 1980s being played alongside contemporary K-pop hits like those from BTS and Blackpink.
One of the most striking aspects of these protests is the emphasis on community and solidarity. During impeachment rallies, many individuals who could not physically attend made “gift payments” at cafes, restaurants, and convenience stores near protest sites, allowing others to get food and drinks for free. Protesters also distributed supplies like light sticks, blankets, batteries, first aid kits, and even vegan food, all accompanied by witty slogans like “charge your sweet democracy.” The act of cleaning up after the protests also symbolized a commitment to creating a civil democratic community.
This “gift-giving” movement encapsulates the political consciousness of 2030 women. It’s not just about protesting; it’s about forging connections and promoting solidarity within the community. The movement calls for the reinvention of politics through shared gifts and collective action (Seo-Han 2025). In December 2024, when farmers from across South Korea, who have been critical of Yoon’s agricultural policies, attempted to drive tractors to the presidential residence to join the pro-impeachment protest, they were blocked by police at the Seoul border. However, large numbers of 2030 women flocked there to lend their support and eventually broke the barricades, symbolizing the strength of solidarity across diverse groups and causes.
Furthermore, 2030 women are actively involved in movements supporting labor unions, sexual minorities (LGBTQIA), and disability rights. Their high levels of engagement in issues related to equality, inclusion, and coexistence point to the emergence of new political forces in South Korea, with women playing a central role in driving these changes. This shift is shaping the future of Korean politics, where new generations are taking charge of the country’s political discourse.
What Remains to be Seen
In recent months, the country has faced unprecedented political turmoil not seen since Korea’s democratization in the late 1980s. Despite this, most Korean intellectuals and journalists predict that the impeachment of the president will be upheld, and the democratic order will be restored in the near future. However, the political landscape in Korea cannot return to what it was before the impeachment.
On the one hand, there is a growing concern about the rise of far-right fascism, which combines conservative Christianity, right-wing nationalism, and anti-communism. If these fears materialize, we might witness a situation where the conservative right, traditionally opposed to left-wing movements, rejects modern legal and political systems, undoing the country’s liberal progress. This shift toward far-right politics is not unique to Korea, as it mirrors a global trend where political ideologies have been shifting to the right since the 2010s, with far-right movements gaining influence worldwide. Thus, this concern may not be an unfounded one (Park 2025).
On the other hand, the impeachment process has led to the emergence of women in their 20s and 30s as a new political force in Korea. These women have not only introduced a new form of protest culture, one that integrates K-pop fandom, but have also shown wisdom in uniting with various progressive movements, working to overcome the divisive limitations often seen in identity politics. By championing politics for ordinary people, advocating for peace in daily life, and promoting individual equality, these young women have opened up new possibilities for progressive politics in Korea. It remains to be seen what outcomes these young women, who focus on individualism, egalitarianism, and pragmatism, rather than the far-left ideologies crushed under the right-wing anti-communist regime, will bring about.
The rise of far-right conservatism and the rise of a new generation of female political participants raise many questions about the future of Korea’s political culture. Will Korean society follow the global trend toward extreme right-wing politics and perhaps even reproduce a form of fascism? This question looms large. Extreme right-wing politics in Korea could lead to a dangerous political culture, one that emphasizes “difference” and fuels discrimination based on ethnicity, class, generation, and gender. In a society where the myths about masculinity and ethnonationalism are so deeply ingrained, we could see a dangerous normalization of witch hunting as hatred and fear of women and immigrants spread.
In contrast, could Korea’s progressive camp, especially the 2030 women, create a new political community grounded in relationships, interdependence, and solidarity? Could they create new historical and cultural experiences that defy the current divisions? If their worldview and political culture can bridge generational divides and establish global citizenship as a dominant ideology rather than reinforcing conservative nationalism, there’s potential for a transformative shift in Korean politics. However, if they fail to address the generational and cultural rifts, particularly with older generations and men within their own age group on issues like gender equality, their political project may struggle. In the coming years, as digital and AI technologies continue to shape the future of knowledge, ideology, and culture, it will be crucial to observe whether this digitally-savvy and forward-thinking younger generation will fall into regressive identity politics or contribute to the restoration of human connection by fostering solidarity and strengthening relationships (Castells 2011).
References
An, Seonyoung 안선영. 2024. “한국경제에 날아온 900조 ‘계엄 청구서’” [900 Trillion “Martial Law Bills” Flying into the Korean Economy]. 아주경제 [Aju Economy], 17 December. https://www.ajunews.com/view/20241216085047984
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2003. Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Castells, Manuel. 2011. The Power of Identity. 2nd Ed. Wiley-Blackwell.
Chae, Suhong, and Soo Jin Kim. 2010. “The Candlelight Protest and the Politics of the Baby Stroller Brigades.” Korea Journal 50, no. 3: 71–99.
Chang, Jaesun, and Jieun Kim 장재선 김지은. 2025. “조갑제 ‘부당한 지시 응하지 않은 적법 항명… 여기서 희망을 본다’” [Cho Gab-je, “Refusing Unjust Orders is ‘Legal Disobedience’… This is Where I See Hope”]. 문화일보 [Munhwa Daily], 16 January.
Choe, Sang-Hun. 2025. “How ‘Stop the Steal’ Became a Protest Slogan in South Korea.” New York Times, 4 January.
Choi, Hye-jeong. 2025. “Yoon’s Not the Only Korean Addicted to the Algorithm.” Hankyoreh, 4 February. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1180711.html
Choi, Wonjun, and Seungyeon Kim. 최원준 김승연. 2025. “불면증에 공황장애 재발까지….‘계엄 무기력증’ 겪는 시민들” [Insomnia and Panic Disorder Reoccurring … Citizens Suffering from ‘Martial Law Apathy’]. 국민일보 [Kookmin Daily], 7 January. https://www.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0025911548
Hwang, Hodeok 황호덕. 2025. “윤석열 대통령 구속 기소…헌정 사상 첫 현직 대통령 재판행” [President Yoon Seok-yeol Arrested and Indicted… First Sitting President in Constitutional History to Be Tried]. 경기인저널 [Gyeoggiinjournal], 28 January. https://www.gijn.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=423255
Hong, Seok Kyeong 홍석경. 2024. “K-팝 팬덤들이 ‘탄핵’ 응원봉 치켜든 의미” [The Meaning of K-pop Fandoms Raising ‘Impeachment’ Cheer Sticks]. 더칼럼니스트 [The Columnist], 16 December. https://www.thecolumnist.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=3394
Jang, Yujin 장유진. 2024. “아이돌 응원봉에, 선결제 커피까지…‘집회 문화’, 이렇게 달라졌다” [From Idol Cheer Sticks to Prepaid Coffee … How ‘Protest Culture’ Has changed]. 이투데이 [eToday], 9 December. https://www.etoday.co.kr/news/view/2427555
Kim, Regina. 2025. “Everything you need to know about the Nth room case in ‘cyber hell’.” TUDUM by Neflix. 27 May. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nth_Room_case.
Lee, Soo Jung. 2011. “The Korean War and the Politics of Memory: Focusing on the Case of Kangbyon Incident.” Korean Cultural Anthropology 44, no. 1: 85–118.
Lee, Soomin and Kyungsang Hwang 이수민 황경상. 2024. “탄핵 집회 정점 때 41만 7천명 넘어…20대가 50대 추월” [Over 417,000 at the Peak of the Impeachment Rally… 20s Surpass 50s]. 경향신문 [Kyunghyang Shinmun], 19 December. https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/032/0003340528
Lee, Yujin 이유진. 2024. “윤석열, 트럼프에게 힘 과시? 권위주의 모방해 한국 민주주의 위협” [Yoon Seok-yeol, Showing Off His Power to Trump? Threatening Korean Democracy by Imitating Authoritarianism]. 한겨레21 [Hankyoreh 21], 7 December. https://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/56491.html
Mackenzie, Jean. 2024. “South Korean Politician Blames Women for Rising Male Suicides.” BBC, 10 July. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cml2kvd2dvno
Park, No-Ja 박노자. 2025. “윤석렬 내란의 세계사적 맥락” [Yoon Seok-yeol’s Rebellion in a Global Historical Context]. 한겨레[Hankyoreh], 8 January. https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/1176845.html
Seo-Han, Younggyo 서한영교. 2025. “2030 여성, ‘선물하는 연대’로 광장의 정치를 재발명하다” [2030 Women, Reinventing Politics of the Square with ‘Gifted Solidarity’]. 한국일보 [Hankook Ilbo], 24 January. https://v.daum.net/v/20250104043040105
- In South Korea, the terms conservatism and progressivism are often seen as “locally specific” concepts. While these political ideologies resemble the platforms of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, there is little practical policy difference between the two camps in Korea, with the main distinctions lying in their stances on anti-communism and human rights. As a result, in the Korean context, the terms “far right” and “far left” are typically used to describe the extremes of conservatism and progressivism, respectively.
