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Ui Jun

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by Ui Jun

Introduction: Sixteen years ago, in 1987, Ui Jun left his post as an assistant in the engineering department at Tokyo University to go to Okinawa, then becoming an important new front in the anti-pollution struggle. With three of Japan's five most polluted rivers, and with the nation's worst water pollution, tropical Okinawa was simultaneously the crucible of American military bases, Japan's poorest prefecture and its most polluted. Ui's report is the summation of his sixteen years of teaching, research and working in the environmental movement on Okinawa.

A lifelong experimenter, Ui began his lifelong commitment to science in the second grade when he observed that adding vinegar to the juice of morning glory turned the blue juice red. After graduating in applied chemistry at Tokyo University, Ui went to work for Nippon Zeon, a company that used mercury as a catalyst in producing fertilizer and other products, disposing of the waste in the river. Zeon released the effluent secretly into the river at night, Ui recalled. About the time that he returned to Tokyo University after working for three years at Zeon, the news broke about the deadly mercury poisoning that was soon labeled Minamata disease, the product of the Chisso Corporation's polluting the water at its chemical plants.

Ui's research showed that if one put the crystal of methyl mercury, which was the pollutant from the factory disposal water on fish and fed it to cats, the result was Minamata disease. The cause and effect relationship was found within the factory. But, he recalled, "when I discussed it with colleagues in the medical school, no one wanted to listen, perhaps because medical research was funded by the company."

In 1968-69, at the time of the university struggles in Japan, Ui was researching pollution and water purification in Scandinavia. He returned to find that the students he had studied with had scattered: some had been jailed, some were in hospital with injuries incurred in the student struggles, some had joined sects and their whereabouts were unknown. The civil engineering department was in shambles after the administration called in the police to quell student protests.

No one in the engineering school was interested in the study of pollution. So Ui, a lowly assistant, after winning support of Tokyo University President, Kato Ichiro, was granted permission to set up a lecture series, with all classes open to the public. Because the course was offered at night, Ui was able to ignore strictures that he stick closely to technical questions and ignore issues of political economy such as power and profit that he quickly realized were central to the understanding of environmental pollution. Beginning in 1970, Jishu Koza, as the series was called, initiated both the first extended study of pollution in Japanese universities and the citizens movement to publicize and combat pollution. Within a year, eight hundred people, many of them traveling great distances, were attending the lectures and investigating and fighting pollution in their localities. But this open democratic approach, enormously successful in the cultivation of a generation of citizen-scientist civic activists, and the model for the subsequent anti-nuclear forum established by the late Takagi Jinzaburo, did not impress Ui's employers at Tokyo University. They refused him any promotion, keeping him longer on the lowest level, joshu or assistant, for more than fifteen years, longer than almost anybody in the history of the institution, and shed no tears at his departure for Okinawa.

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The sixteen years since 1986 when I moved to the University of Okinawa from my position as research assistant at the University of Tokyo have gone by in a flash and I have reached retirement from the university. During the time I taught environmental theory in independent courses at the University of Tokyo, I had planned to stay there as an assistant until my retirement and then go to Okinawa. However, I was ashamed by my senior colleague, Professor Tamanoi Yoshirô, who said that with my leisurely attitude the island would dissolve before I got there. Indeed, when I came to Okinawa it turned out to be almost too late, and I must admit that time had run out while I had been trying to tackle the problems in front of me one after another. I had absolutely no time to dig and try to figure out why things had come to this state.

The overall picture is quite clear. Okinawa, which makes up just 0.6 per cent of Japan's land, contains more than 70 per cent of the U.S. military bases. If the U.S. bases were spread out evenly, Okinawa would have more or less 0.6
per cent of them, but it has more than one hundred times that share. Since this is clearly an enormous burden, it creates all kinds of frictions. The central government pours huge sums of money on to this little island as compensation for the burden that it places on Okinawa and each unexpected incident that occurs there. Most of the funds are for construction projects, which do not match Okinawa’s reality, so they end up being utterly destructive to the coral reefs and primeval forests that symbolize the subtropical environment. For example, after the 1995 incident in which three GIs raped a twelve year-old girl, 5 billion yen were immediately provided. 10 billion yen were provided when the prefectural governor changed from an anti-base reformist to a pro-base conservative. When it was decided that an alternative to Futenma base would be built in Northern Okinawa, twelve cities and towns were promised 10 billion yen per year for a duration of ten years - a total of 100 billion yen - for public-works projects. The sixteen years of my stay in Okinawa have been a continuous and never-ending struggle against these destructive developmental projects. I weekly accept the criticism that things have come to this state because I have been engaged in minor details without fighting against the fundamental problem of the Japan-U.S. security system. However, just as doctors cannot leave sick people to their own devices, technicians cannot help getting engaged in the problems they can handle right in front of them and they worry day and night about how to distribute their abilities. In the case of Okinawa, since examples of excellent research regarding the contradictions of the Japan-U.S. security system and its burden on Okinawa are produced even under difficult circumstances and are available close at hand - for instance that of Arasaki Moriteru - one cannot help but allocate one’s own energy and time to address immediate problems. Having reached the end of my work after sixteen years in Okinawa, it is necessary to reevaluate the choices I made. Just as I was beginning to think about this, I was given the opportunity to write about foreign policy through the lens of Okinawa, and so I have tried to take up the matter here.

Right now, what goes on at U.S. military bases today is discussed when waste oil flows outside a base as a result of accidents, but there is hardly any accumulation of concrete data. Thus the possibility of harmful substances inside bases became an issue only in 1995 after the return of the Onna Communication Base to Japan. There, it was found that the soil left inside the purification tanks, which was considered as fertilizer, turned out to contain high concentrations of harmful substances including mercury, cadmium, arsenic and PCBs, and the idea of using it as fertilizer was abandoned. Until then, I think that the possibility of harmful substances on U.S. military bases had hardly been discussed.

There had been news that could have become a key to understanding the issues at hand if attention had been paid to them. The Fukuchi Dam, which provides most of the water to the main island of Okinawa is used by the U.S. armed forces for river crossing exercises. It was reported numerous times that in the forest surrounding the dam, large amounts of unused munitions had been thrown away. It just so happened that the abandonment of munitions was discovered during biological surveys on the maneuver grounds in the Northern parts of the island. At the time of the Persian Gulf War, the use of depleted uranium munitions became an issue. However, it was only in 1997 that the United States Marines admitted using munitions containing depleted uranium during its exercises from 1995 to 1996 on the islands west of Kume Island, acknowledged that this was a violation of the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Power in Japan, and notified the Japanese government that most of the munitions had been recovered and removed. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not pass on this information to the prefectural government of Okinawa and the citizens of Okinawa prefecture only learned about the problem through an article in the Washington Times. This announcement itself was made reluctantly after a Japanese television station had come to report it, and if there had been no television coverage, it probably never would have come to light. The Japanese government subsequently carried out two surveys of the concerned area and reported that – with the exception of the immediate surroundings of the remaining abandoned munitions – high figures indicating pollution were not recorded.

The existence of this kind of pollution cannot be ascertained unless exhaustive tests are conducted. I had the bitter experience of taking and analyzing samples from several places that seemed polluted within Futenma Base without finding anything suspicious. To find this kind of pollution, one must collect samples in broad daylight with a detailed map indicating where the munitions had actually hit. Otherwise, one will be unable to identify the real state of pollution. One also needs high-level experience in sample taking. In any case, we can assume that it is still premature to conclude that pollution from depleted uranium does not exist or that one does not need to worry about it.

When the transfer of the airport away from the Futenma Base and its return to Japan became a political issue as a result of the 1995 rape, apprehensions regarding base contamination came to the fore. The data about the pollution of the soil in the purification tanks at Onna Communication Base were published right after that incident.

However, regarding the return of land that has been polluted, Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Status of the United States Armed Forces Agreement clearly states that the responsibility for the reestablishment of status quo ante does not lie with the United States. When we rent a house in our everyday lives, it is common sense to agree to return the house to its previous state when we move out. From this perspective, it seems obvious that if the value of the land has decreased due to pollution, the renters should
return it after removing the pollution at their own cost. Thus this clause seems very one-sided. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims, however, that this clause should be seen against Paragraph 2 of Article 4, which provides that the Japanese government does not have to pay for the facilities and buildings constructed by the U.S. armed forces when the land is returned. Thus, considered as a whole, they argue that Article 4 is bilateral and equal. Certainly, the area had probably been wasteland when it was adopted as a base, so returning it with the facilities and buildings on it might have increased the land’s value to Japan’s advantage. However, as with a rented house, one usually anticipates the problem of diminished value due to wear and tear and dirt. From this commonsense perspective, Article 4 as a whole is utterly unilateral and no doubt disadvantageous for Japan. Was this not considered when the agreement was formulated? Or perhaps there was no other way due to the unequal power relations between the two parties.

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In cases where there is pollution, the Japanese government is burdened with the fees for its removal, and it already knows that removing pollution and restoring the land is no easy task from its experience with environmental pollution. If it does not admit the damage or underestimates it, it can save on the measures. The state’s post facto relief measures are not suited for such kind of problems in the first place. We in Okinawa, including myself, have not really thought about the fact that the application of Article 4 of the Status Agreement is unsuitable for cases where negative factors, such as pollution, are involved and it only results in bringing about disadvantages for Japan. The truth is that the environmental problem was not included at all in the "Ten Demands" (see box 1) hastily put together by Okinawa prefecture after the 1995 rape, and – with the exception of the Communist Party – hardly anyone had pointed out the absurdities of Article 4. The Communist Party took a leading part in conducting empirical research on the problems of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Status Agreement which was published in A Point by Point Critique of the Japan-U.S. Status Agreement (Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 1997), but even there, there is little mention of pollution in the analysis of Article 4.

When the Okinawa prefectural government began the task of establishing the Basic Environmental Regulations in 1999, the NGO to which I am affiliated – the Okinawa Environment Network - brought up the problem of U.S. military bases as a major factor determining the environment in Okinawa. We spelled out the responsibilities to be shoudered by the U.S. military bases and submitted our proposal to the prefectoral Council for the Environment. The members of the Council, however, caved in to the demand of the Personnel Bureau to delete the proposal because dealing with the U.S. armed forces was really beyond all capacity. Hence, they rejected our proposal and implemented harmless, unobtrusive regulations similar to those of other prefectures. However – as I learned only recently – the governments of Japan and the United States had in fact already published a joint statement regarding “Environmental Principles” by that time (see box 2). That is to say, the regulation of the U.S. military bases could have been integrated into such legislation, but the prefectoral Bureau for the Environment, the Council for the Environment and our NGO were unaware of this.

Actually, something else had been hidden from us from much earlier on. I regret that it would have served our case in Okinawa very well if it had come to light. I refer to the document (see box 3) said to have been agreed upon by a Japan-U.S. joint committee. Based on this agreement, at least it would have been possible to request for inspections and publication of the results, and we could have also obtained samples. When I think of this, I wonder why this document was not published for thirty years. Many things could have been achieved during that time. Concerning the question of why the document was not published sooner, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kawaguchi responded that at least it did not seem to be the case that it was hidden because its content was disadvantageous. However, this kind of lack of sense of responsibility definitely brings about disadvantageous results in Okinawa’s current situation. Especially in the case of environmental problems, seemingly small things build up little by little before a large clue is obtained, so this gap of thirty years was indeed a waste.

It was in response to this kind of situation that the Okinawa Environment Network has decided to begin by holding small workshops at Okinawa University from 18 March to discuss the existence of military bases and environmental problems. The aim of the workshop is to find out the content of the U.S. military bases which are in a black box situation by inviting representatives from countries where U.S. military bases have existed in the past or still exist, such as the Philippines, Vietnam and South Korea, and comparing the experiences of the American NGOs which have been involved in the restoration of bases to their original state. It also aims to try to improve matters at least a little by collaborating with South Korea, which is also already suffering under the unequal status agreement. We have not received any positive response to our invitation from the Okinawan government and the Japanese national government, but the United States Marines has offered to report on the fact that they are making some efforts. Some members at our planning committee opposed the idea of devoting time to the United States Marines. Others, however, think it appropriate for such a workshop and we are curious about what we will get to hear. It is regrettable that the Okinawan government is not represented at such meetings as usual and it reflects upon the attitude of the prefectoral government, but we intend to report the content of the discussions and so on to the prefectoral government as much as possible.
Holding such workshops causes one to truly admire the pioneering foreign policy work of Utsunomiya Tokuma. Even though renegotiation of the unequal and unilateral status agreement was strongly demanded within Japan, among the Foreign Ministers and bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only former Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko responded that she would look into the matter. All other responses suggested improvements in the running of the system, which were in fact about the maintenance of the status quo. Prime Minister Hashimoto had suggested that since it would be too much for someone to go from Okinawa and do the rounds at government offices each time some incident occurred, the situation might improve if an ambassador-level bureaucrat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were posted at Okinawa to negotiate with the U.S. armed forces. Thus an office for the Okinawa Ambassador was established, but it seemed that the situation did not change very much. In particular, the former Ambassador Hashimoto - who used to argue loudly against explanations of the local municipal assembly members, claiming that the crime rate of members of the United States armed forces was lower than the average crime rate of Okinawa - tended to be criticized by the people wondering which side he was on. He had a reputation of being a relative of Prime Minister Hashimoto and someone who carried his head high. The local people consider that the way in which such people who know nothing about Okinawa are sent here reveals the attitude of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding how to tackle the Okinawan problem.

As can be seen from the fact that the 10 demands lack a perspective on environmental problems and therefore make no allusion to the inequality in Article 4, almost no one anticipated, even on the Okinawan side, that pollution within bases was likely to become a serious problem until the specific dates were set for the return of Futenma. Within everyday prefectural administration, too, policies toward environmental problems had low priority and there was a tendency to prioritize development and industrialization. This was true of the administrations under Governors Nishime and Ōta, and it has become even more so under the Inamine prefectural government, which is controlled by the conservatives. Thus, within the Bureau for the Environment, which tends to be made light of in the first place, the politics of self-protection and safety-first principles of cautiously proceeding in order to be as unobtrusive as possible prevails. The Bureau has lost all power to dig up problems on its own. This is what I strongly felt, having jostled with the prefectural government about many problems beginning with the issue of Shin-ishiigaki airport. Given the environmental regulations and the procedures for assessment of environmental problems described above, negotiations on an equal footing with the United States through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has no experience with such problems and lacks the will to take them up, will certainly be difficult unless someone with unusually strong leadership confronts the situation over a considerably long term by accumulating research on past precedents.

Okinawa’s only weapon in such negotiation is the fact that the environmental reality has deteriorated. The damage caused by hiding the 1973 agreement is enormous and the Okinawan people must follow up on the huge responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which caused it. It makes one wonder whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs exists for the United States armed forces or for the Okinawan people.

Thus when we understand the way the problems of military bases and the environment have developed, we can see that the efforts – including my own – to deal with them have come late. My strategy of investing energy in specialization or division of labor seems to have been a mistake. Realizing this at the end of my stay in Okinawa is too late, but fortunately I have high hopes for the Okinawa Environment Network and its central figure, young Ms. Sunagawa Kaori, who has already taken up several tasks starting with the workshop.

Even the central government seems to have noticed the existence of the problem. On 12 March, in the Council for the Reform of the United States Armed Forces Status in Japan within the Kōmeitō Party, it was pointed out that various problems had arisen due to the lack of environmental regulations (Ryûkyû Shinpô, 13 March 2003). In addition to the Onna Communication Base incident of 1995 noted above, the article reported on the 1999 hexavalent chromium pollution on the grounds of the Kadena Ammunition Storage area when it was partially returned, the 2002 discovery of waste oil drums on the grounds of the returned Camp Zukeran, and the poisonous lead pollution caused by clay shooting exercises on Camp Courtney. However, we should also be aware of the problem in Okinawa that such kinds of reports often disappear from the news. For instance, when there was an expected increase in tourism to Kume Island by the introduction of direct flights from Tokyo, news regarding the depleted uranium ammunitions in the islands disappeared.

When we think about it, the defoliant Agent Orange containing dioxin that had caused huge problems during the Vietnam War had been transported from Okinawa and had caused serious injuries to both the Vietnamese people who were sprayed with it and the American soldiers who had carried out the spraying. Depending on where and how the defoliant was stored in Okinawa, there is a possibility of strong dioxin pollution existing today. Unless the way in which the defoliant was handled within the American military bases is made clear, it will be difficult to determine the extent of the damage because that kind of pollution usually affects very small areas. Furthermore, what we are talking about now is the transportation of substances over thirty years ago. How far would it be possible to trace them?
But if we do not carry out such investigations now – as we have seen in the case of the Onna Communication Base – there will be arguments between and within governments regarding responsibility for the polluted areas and the people of Okinawa will bear the brunt of the damage in the end. First, we need to begin by reopening the negotiations on the unilateral status agreement, which allows the United States armed forces to evade responsibility. No matter what the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may think, unless they take up this issue, the suffering of Okinawa will not end.

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Translation by Sabine Frühstück and Yumiko Tokita-Tanabe

BOX 1


1. Article 2 of the Status of Forces Agreement is to be revised to clearly state that the Japanese government must heed the voices of local governments on the location of institutions and bases. If the location of institutions and bases has a negative impact on the development of local communities, their relocation must be demanded from and granted by the United States government.

2. Article 3 of the Status of Forces Agreement should be revised as follows: state clearly that with respect to the noise caused by air traffic and the protection of the environment, both of which greatly affect local communities, Japanese laws must be applied to the institutions and areas as well. In addition, if local governmental bodies desire to enter the institutions and areas, the U.S. military must promptly grant permission to do so.

In the case of large accidents such as airplane accidents, the cause must be immediately investigated and the local government concerned must be promptly informed. Establish additional orders concerning maneuvers by the U.S. armed forces, with the restrictions clearly stated. If an incident or accident occurs during a maneuver or exercise, the imposition of penalties - such as the discontinuation of maneuver or exercise and so on - against the unit which caused the incident or accident must be clearly stated. Prohibit the use by Japanese of golf courses within the institutions and bases.

3. Article 5 of the Status of Forces Agreement should be revised as follows: state clearly that military use of civilian airports is prohibited with exception in emergencies. In addition, the definition of "moving of troops" must be clarified and marching in civilian areas prohibited.

4. Concerning Article 6 of the Status of Forces Agreement, a Japanese-American consultation is necessary regarding the transfer of air control powers to Japan at Naha airport.

5. Article 9 of the Status of Forces Agreement should clearly state that Japanese laws are to be applied to the medical inspection of people, animals and plants and the health and physical hygiene of people.

6. Concerning Article 10 of the Status of Forces Agreement, spell out the criteria for number plates that can easily be recognized as vehicles for military use by the population in the prefecture.

7. Article 13 of the Status of Forces Agreement should be revised as follows: state clearly that car and light vehicle taxes on cars for private use that are owned by United States armed forces personnel are to be taxed in the same manner as those of other civilians living in the prefecture.

8. Article 17 of the Status of Forces Agreement should be revised as follows: state clearly that in cases when members of the United States armed forces, their family members and others affiliated with the United States armed forces cause damage during or outside their official duties, the Japanese state bears the responsibility to compensate the victims.

9. Article 18 of the Status of Forces Agreement should be revised as follows: state clearly that opinions of relevant local governmental bodies must be heard at the Japan-U.S. Joint Council with respect to the running of bases and that the articles on which mutual agreement has been reached by the Japan-U.S. Joint Council be made public promptly.

BOX 2

Joint Publication of Environmental Principles (11 September 2000)

The Japanese national government and the U.S. national government both acknowledge that it is increasingly important to protect the environment. This acknowledgment includes agreement regarding the prevention of pollution in the institutions and areas permitted for use by the United States armed forces according to the Japanese-American Security Treaty and related agreements and in the local communities in the neighborhood of these institutions and areas. The common goal of both governments is to maintain the health and
safety of the local communities in the vicinity of these institutions and areas as well as the families and dependents of the members of the United States armed forces in Japan.

Control Standards
The set of regulations that apply to the United States armed forces in Japan for the protection and safety of the environment is the Japan Environmental Government Standard (JEGS). The JEGS has emerged from the conviction that the Japanese-American regulations had to become stricter. As a result, the environmental standards of the United States armed forces in Japan generally satisfy or exceed the Japanese standard. The Japanese and the United States governments review the JEGS every two years and strengthen their joint efforts to improve it. The American government conforms to all applicable regulations and continues to contribute to the efforts to protect the environment in Japan.

Exchange of Information and Inspection
The national government of Japan and the national government of the United States sufficiently strive to provide adequate information through the framework of the Joint Council on issues that have an impact on the health of the Japanese population and the dependents and families of the United States armed forces in Japan. Furthermore, the national government of Japan and the national government of the United States follow the procedures of the Joint Council and provide adequate access to the institutions and areas. This includes the access necessary for joint environmental surveys and monitoring.

Response to Environmental Pollution
The national government of Japan and the national government of the United States consult each other about every possible dangers of environmental pollution within the institutions and areas as well as in the local communities in the vicinity of these institutions and areas. The United States government reaffirms policies which ensure the immediate cleanup of imminent and substantially threatening instances of pollution - no matter what kind - that clearly affect people's health and are caused by the United States armed forces in Japan. Following relevant regulations, the national government of Japan takes all possible steps to adequately deal with large-scale pollution caused by sources outside the institutions and areas.

Environmental Consultation
The environment division and other related divisions of the Joint Council hold regular meetings to discuss environmental issues within the institutions and areas as well as those concerning the local communities in the vicinity of these institutions and areas in Japan. Working groups are established in order to consult on specific environmental problems as occasion demands.

BOX 3

1. Following the joint publication on environmental principles that had been put together by our government and the United States government on 11 September, 2000, and also in response to increasing environmental consciousness in our country in recent years and the debates in the parliament at the end of last year, the Japan-U.S. Joint Council decided on the 23rd (Thursday) to publish the 1973 Japan-U.S. Joint Council Agreement on environmental matters.

2. In this Japan-U.S. Joint Council Agreement, procedures are provided for the national government and the local governmental units to demand from the U.S. armed forces command on site the examination and reports on environmental pollution caused in and around U.S. armed forces institutions and areas that has possible impact on the welfare of the local communities. Procedures are also provided for the national government and the local governmental units to request for entry and inspection of polluted areas and obtain samples.

1973 Joint Council Agreement
"On Cooperation Concerning the Environment" (short version)
In response to the increasing environmental consciousness, and in the acknowledgment of the shared responsibility of the Japanese national government and the United States government, it is to both countries' advantage to pay adequate attention to the pollution that is caused by the United States armed forces through use of the institutions and areas provided to them by the status agreement and to find a solution that is mutually satisfactory. The U.S. armed forces wish to be a member of society where there is no pollution. In this regard, concerning matters of pollution, the regulations below are to be followed in principle drawing on the initiative of local people in order to solve them.

(a) Procedures of municipalities and prefectures(1) If a reasonable case can be made that the pollution of water, oil, chemicals or other substances by [U.S. armed forces] institutions and areas have an impact on the welfare of the local community, municipalities and/or the prefectural government, with the help of the local defense institutions, can demand an on-site survey from the United States
armed forces command. The prefectural government and/or the municipalities are to be informed of the results of the survey as promptly as possible.

(2) In cases in which the prefectural government and/or the municipalities, with the support of the local defense institution, consider it necessary to directly inspect the area in question, or take samples from the relevant place, including water and/or soil, soot, smoke, fuel of permanent installations and facilities, the United States armed forces command on site can become the contact point and provide permission for such an inspection and for the taking of samples.

(b) Procedures for the Japanese government
If the Japanese national government considers it necessary to directly inspect the polluted area in question or to take samples from the relevant place, including water and/or soil, soot, smoke, fuel of permanent installations and facilities, the method and procedure of inspection and sample collection will go through the Japan-U.S. Joint Council and be dealt with by the appropriate sections of both governments. The municipalities and the prefectural government can participate in such a direct inspection if the Japan-U.S. Joint Council agrees.

(c) In case the municipalities, the prefectural government or the Japanese national government desire a direct inspection outlined in (a) (2) and (b), they are to meet with the adequate unit of the United States armed forces. When the inspections are carried out and the results are determined, appropriate and applicable environmental standards are to be reexamined.

(d) The United States armed forces in Japan takes all measures it considers necessary in order to comply with the regulations outlined in (a) (1) regarding surveys and those outlined in (a) (2) and (b) regarding inspection and notifies the Japanese government of the steps taken.