

Ending the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy

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This second report focuses solely on the nuclear issue, updating and enlarging upon the earlier recommendations made by the Task Force.

A Proposal by the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy, Selig S. Harrison, Chairman

Cosponsored by The Center for International Policy and The Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago

The Task Force met three times in connection with the formulation of the first report (November 20 and December 5, 2002, and January 9, 2003) and reconvened in a day-long meeting on May 28, 2004, initiating a process of consultation and debate that continued until a final consensus was reached on November 10, 2004.

This report represents the consensus of the Task Force members. All members do not necessarily endorse all aspects of this report. Members participated in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their organizations.

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Foreword

On March 1, 2003, the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy published a detailed, 32-page report that analyzed recent developments in both North Korea and South Korea and discussed U.S. policy options in the Korean peninsula against the background of broader U.S. regional interests in Northeast Asia. The report presented recommendations embracing a wide range of key issues, including the resolution of the nuclear crisis with North Korea, the resumption of negotiations to limit or end North Korean missile development and the replacement of the 1953 Korean War Armistice with a peace treaty.

Ford Foundation and the Center for East Asian Studies of the University of Chicago.

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Key Findings and Recommendations

The Greater Urgency of the Plutonium Threat

"The central issue that has emerged in the negotiations to date is whether to focus initially on what is, demonstrably, an already-existent plutonium program that is actively producing fissile material or to address at the outset both the known plutonium program and a suspected program for enriching uranium about which little is known."

"The Task Force recommends that the United States should give priority to dealing with the clear and present threat posed by the plutonium program." (p.8)

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Does a Weapons-Grade Uranium Enrichment Program Exist?

"No evidence has yet been presented publicly to justify the conclusion that facilities capable of producing high-enriched, weapons-grade uranium exist in North Korea. No such evidence has been made available to the U.S. Congress or to other states participating in the sixnation negotiations. At the same time, the Task Force finds that the evidence so far available does suggest the existence of a pilot or experimental program..."

"Given the greater urgency of the threat posed by the plutonium program, the start of the negotiation process should no longer be delayed by the continuation of the stalemate that has resulted from attempting to compel North Korean acknowledgement of a weapons-grade uranium enrichment program...Whether a weapons-grade program exists...would be difficult to determine without North Korean cooperation as part of an agreed denuclearization process with intrusive inspections. The Task Force recommends, therefore, that the United States should give priority to dealing with the clear and present threat posed by the plutonium program and confront the uranium issue in the final stages of the process after greater trust has been developed through step-by-step mutual concessions."

The Task Force recommends a four-step proposal designed to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea starting with a freeze of its plutonium program accompanied by additional measures that reflect a "recognition of the urgency of the threat posed by its possession of significant quantities of weapons-usable plutonium that could be transferred to third parties."

Calling for "the complete removal of all of this plutonium from North Korea in the first phase of denuclearization," the Task Force declared, "In order to get North Korea to take the extraordinary step of giving up its plutonium the United States, South Korea, China, and Russia should be prepared to offer significant economic and political incentives including, "substantial bilateral and multilateral programs of assistance...valued collectively in accordance with an agreed price per kilogram" of plutonium. The Task Force pointed out that the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement with North Korea, known as the Agreed Framework, deferred the complete removal of the plutonium until the final phase of the denuclearization process. (p. 13)

THE FOUR-STEP DENUCLEARIZATION PROCESS

Preparatory Phase
Declaration of Denuclearization
 North Korea would commit itself to the complete elimination of its "nuclear weapons programs," without the specific reference to its

plutonium enrichment facilities required in the June 24, 2004 U.S. denuclearization proposal. The United States would pledge to respect North Korean sovereignty and commit itself to the goal of normalized relations and a tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War (the United States, South Korea and North Korea.) Conditional Security Assurances North Korea would pledge not to initiate a military attack against the United States and would reaffirm its 1991 commitment not to attack South Korea... The United States would pledge not to initiate a military attack against North Korea or to seek to undermine its government... Step One: Eliminating the Post-1994 North Korean Plutonium Inventory North Korea would permit the inspection access necessary for the International Atomic Energy Agency to determine how much plutonium has been reprocessed since the expulsion of the inspectors following the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in December, 2002; the sequestering of this plutonium and any spent fuel under international controls, and the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing plant under international controls.

If North Korea agrees to surrender all of the plutonium found through the inspection process for shipment out of the country, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia would reciprocate with:

The resumption of shipments of the 500,000 tons of oil per year delivered under the Agreed Framework, which were cut off in December 2002.

The exchange of liaison offices with North Korea by the United States and Japan as the first step toward fully normalized relations.

Bilateral and multilateral programs of assistance for the economic and social development of North Korea valued collectively in accordance with an agreed price per kilogram of the plutonium surrendered.

The Task Force does not specify how much should be offered in payment per kilogram. However, for illustrative purposes, it points out that if the plutonium inventory totals 40 kilograms, and if a price of \$25 million per kilogram were agreed upon, the funds available for these assistance programs would total \$1 billion. The Task Force also notes that South Korea and Japan had agreed to provide \$4 billion and \$1 billion respectively to construct light water reactors under the Agreed Framework, and that the United States spent \$405,106,000 from 1995 through 2003 for oil shipments and for administrative support of the light water reactor project.

Upon conclusion of the proposed aid agreement, North Korea would initiate steps to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and permit the resumption of the IAEA inspection access cut off in December, 2002.

Step Two: Plutonium Cleanout

North Korea would agree to surrender the remainder of its plutonium inventory, including pre-1994 plutonium reprocessed prior to the Agreed Framework.

The United States would end the remaining U.S. economic sanctions against Pyongyang and would encourage the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to move toward North Korean membership in these institutions. This would require the removal of North Korea from the U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

Step Three: Eliminating the Plutonium Weapons Infrastructure
North Korea would open previously-barred waste and storage sites and other plutonium-related facilities to a level of inspection acceptable to the IAEA.

The United States would initiate talks with North Korea to set the stage for the elevation of their liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington to the status of embassies.

The United States would declare its readiness to keep open the option of completing one or both of the two light water reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, as South Korea and Japan have urged.

Step Four: Elimination of Weapons-Grade Uranium Enrichment

If North Korea permits the unimpeded inspection access necessary to determine what, if any,

weapons-grade uranium enrichment facilities exist and takes the comprehensive measures necessary to eliminate any such facilities, the United States would:

Establish full diplomatic relations, upgrading its liaison office in Pyongyang to an Embassy.

Authorize Exxon-Mobil to pursue a natural gas pipeline to South Korea that would cross North Korea.

Open negotiations on a tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War.

The nuclear crisis with North Korea has become progressively more serious since the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy published its first report in March, 2003.1 Six-party negotiations in Beijing (the United States, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, China and Russia) have so far failed to stop North Korea from moving ahead with its effort to develop nuclear weapons. The Task Force has decided, therefore, to assess the key issues that have emerged in the negotiations and to present detailed recommendations for a comprehensive settlement with North Korea designed to end its nuclear weapons program completely, verifiably and irreversibly.

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The Task Force commends the Bush Administration for taking a constructive first step toward a settlement with its June 24, 2004, denuclearization proposal to North Korea and urges the Administration to build on this beginning by taking the initiative to shape the terms of a workable settlement. While adhering to the goals defined in the proposal, the Administration should review its strategy for reaching agreement with North Korea after considering the suggestions that have since been made by its negotiating partners, notably South Korea, together with the new proposals embodied in the Task Force recommendations.

Discussing the nuclear crisis in its initial report, the Task Force delivered a grim warning: that the breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework in December, 2002, followed by the expulsion of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear

complex, had left North Korea free to reprocess plutonium metal. Hecker, who participated in the Task Force discussions, did not have the technical means at hand to verify the authenticity of the plutonium metal. He was not able to ascertain whether or not North Korea had reprocessed all of the fuel rods and had actually built nuclear devices. However, he concluded that North Korea did possess the necessary technical skills, facilities and capacity to have reprocessed all the spent fuel rods and to have produced weapons-usable plutonium metal.²

at the Yongbyon reactor. There is "a danger that North Korea could produce sufficient plutonium for four to six nuclear weapons within six to eight months from the fuel rods that have been in storage under the 1994 accord," the report declared. "Getting them out of the country, as envisaged in the accord, and getting inspectors and monitoring equipment back in, should be the top U.S. priority," especially given "the possibility of transfers of fissile material to third parties."

The Hecker visit underlined the central issue that has emerged in the negotiations to date:

This warning has been vindicated during subsequent months by mounting evidence that North Korea has succeeded in reprocessing some or all of the fuel rods. North Korea has stated that in 2003 it reprocessed all 8,000 rods and used the extracted plutonium to "strengthen its deterrent." During a visit by a private U.S. delegation to the Yongbyon nuclear center on January 8, 2004, Dr. Siegfried Hecker, former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, found that the 8,000 rods were, indeed, no longer in the storage pool where they had been kept under international Atomic Energy Agency controls since 1994.

whether to focus initially on what is, demonstrably, an already-existent plutonium program that is actively producing fissile material or to address at the outset both the known North Korean plutonium program and a suspected program for enriching uranium about which little is known.

Despite its denials that such a program exists, there is clear evidence that North Korea has attempted to purchase key components needed for uranium enrichment to weapons-grade. However, it is unclear in most cases whether these purchases have materialized and, if so,

The delegation was then permitted to inspect the operations of the Yongbyon reprocessing facility—the first time it had been shown in operation to any Americans, official or unofficial. North Korean scientists also showed Hecker what they asserted to be 200 grams of

the what quantities.³ No evidence has yet been presented publicly to justify the conclusion that facilities capable of producing highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium exist in North Korea. No such evidence has been made available to the U.S. Congress or to other

states participating in the six-nation negotiations. *the uranium issue in the final stages of the process after greater trust has been developed through step-by-step mutual concessions.*

At the same time, the Task Force finds that the *step mutual concessions.* evidence so far available does suggest the existence of a pilot or experimental enrichment program and strong *North Korean interest in obtaining enrichment technology.*

The assumption that North Korea does have a secret *program to develop uranium-based nuclear weapons rests primarily on intelligence findings pointing to possible Pakistan- North Korean nuclear cooperation. Recent revelations of the nuclear black market activities of the ousted director of Pakistan's nuclear program, Dr. A.Q. Khan, have reinforced suspicions of such cooperation. However, how much technology and equipment, if any, has been supplied, and the level of sophistication involved, remain unclear. Dr. Khan has not discussed the facts publicly, and no foreign access to Dr. Khan has been permitted. China, which*

has been briefed by Pakistani officials and has its own information sources, has publicly expressed skepticism that a weapons-grade enrichment program exists.

Whether a weapons-grade enrichment program *exists and to make exist—and if so, how close it is to producing weapons-grade fissile material in significant quantities—would be difficult to determine without North Korean cooperation as part of an agreed denuclearization process with intrusive inspections. The Task Force recommends, therefore, that the United States should*

give priority to dealing with the clear and present threat posed by the plutonium program and confronting *the DPRK would make a unilateral declaration pledging to "dismantle all of its nuclear programs"*

2. Upon acceptance of the DPRK declaration, the parties would:
- a. provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring as the process proceeded
 - b. begin a study to determine the energy requirements of the DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy programs
 - c. begin a discussion of steps necessary to lift remaining economic sanctions on the DPRK, and on the steps necessary for the removal of the DPRK from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
- e. cease operations of these activities
- f. "permit the securing of all fissile material and the monitoring of fuel rods"
- g. "permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons/ weapons components and key centrifuge parts"
- These steps would be subject to "international verification."
3. Based on the DPRK declaration, "the parties would then conclude a detailed implementation agreement providing for the supervised disabling, dismantling, and elimination" of all DPRK nuclear programs, the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods; and a long-term monitoring program.
4. After the dismantlement is completed, "lasting benefits to the DPRK" would result from the energy survey and the discussions on ending sanctions and the removal of the DPRK from the terrorist list.
- Even after dismantlement, however, a "wholly transformed relationship with the United States" would follow only if the DPRK "changes its behavior on human rights," addresses the "issues underlying" its inclusion on the terrorist list, eliminates chemical and biological weapons programs, "puts an end to the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology, and adopts a less provocative conventional force disposition."
- "To be credible, and for the programs to get underway," the declaration and the agreement would have to include "the uranium enrichment program, and existing weapons, as well as the plutonium program."
- The Task Force welcomes the June 24 initiative as a starting point for negotiations but feels that the U.S. proposal in its present form does not provide a realistic basis for successful negotiations. The proposal fails to take into account the deep distrust existing between the United States and North Korea and thus the need for
4. Upon conclusion of this agreement, "non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK."
5. Implementation of the agreement would begin with a three-month preparatory period in which the DPRK would:

simultaneous steps in which the two sides, in tandem, each make concessions of sufficient importance to the other to reduce distrust and facilitate compromise. In its present form the proposal places the burden on North Korea to make major concessions first without a corresponding assurance of reciprocity by the United States.

The U.S. Proposal

For example, Stage One envisages a unilateral North Korean declaration, pledging complete denuclearization, that would set the stage for conclusion of a detailed agreement in Stage Three providing for the "supervised disabling dismantling, and elimination of all nuclear programs," including the suspected uranium enrichment program.

To get North Korea to make a denuclearization pledge, the Task Force believes, the declaration should be more symmetrical, coupling a pledge North Korea to eliminate nuclear weapons programs and fissile material with simultaneous pledge by the other powers concerned that affirms respect for North Korea's sovereignty and explicitly rules out a military first strike or an economic embargo. The Task Force agrees that an acceptable settlement with North Korea must eventually bring about all the detailed denuclearization measures spelled out in Stage Three, including the elimination of weapons-grade uranium enrichment capabilities if they exist.

However, given the existing level of distrust between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korea is unlikely to commit itself to these measures in advance without reciprocal commitments by the other parties to the settlement. It must be induced to take them in the step-by-step fashion outlined in this report, with *quid pro quo*s along the way. Moreover, in contrast to the precision and magnitude of the North Korean concessions detailed in the proposed agreement, the rewards offered in return would be minimal: an undefined provisional security assurance; "discussions" on long-term energy assistance and removal from the terrorist list, with no hint of possible action; and short-term oil shipments of unspecified size, primarily from South Korea and other "non-U.S. parties."

The fact that the United States would not participate in the oil shipments offered in Stage Four signals to North Korea that a nuclear settlement would not in itself lead to normalized relations. Yet it is the promise of normalization and of an end to a perceived U.S. threat to its survival that make a settlement attractive to North Korea. North Korea is not likely to move toward complete denuclearization, the Task Force believes, unless the United States is prepared to match North Korean concessions with reciprocal steps toward the normalization of political and economic relations and toward a

tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War (the Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow and Seoul United States, North Korea and South Korea). They have all made clear that they would welcome a June 24 U.S. proposal for bilateral U.S.-North Korean dialogue and holds out the hope for a "wholly transformed relationship" with the United States only if they favor a step-by-step approach to a settlement addressed initially to plutonium.

North Korea "changes its behavior on human rights," eliminates chemical and biological weapons programs, puts an end to the proliferation of "missiles and missile-related technology," and adopts a "less provocative conventional force disposition."

The U.S. proposal contrasted sharply with the more limited and loosely-defined North Korean offer to freeze its plutonium program, made behind closed doors in the August, 2003, and June, 2004 rounds of six-party negotiations and spelled out publicly most fully in discussions with the Task Force Chairman⁵ and with Task Force member Donald P. Gregg during their visits to Pyongyang in April and July, 2004, respectively.

The Task Force agrees that human rights, chemical and biological weapons, missiles and conventional arms control are all issues that should be on the negotiating agenda with North Korea. But progress on these issues should not be a precondition for normalization. In its opening offer at the six-party talks, North Korea On the contrary, they are more likely to be resolved in a climate of improved relations than in one dominated by mutual suspicion. South Korea accepted this view in a proposal of its own spelled out most fully on June 24, in which the normalization of U.S. and Japanese relations with North Korea would take place once the nuclear issue is resolved.

The U.S. offer defined a freeze as limited to the shutdown of the five-megawatt reactor and the reprocessing plant at Yongbyon under international inspection. However, depending on what the United States is prepared to do in return, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan told the Task Force Chairman that North Korea might also permit the inspections necessary to determine how much plutonium has been reprocessed from the 8,000 fuel rods removed from storage in December, 2002 and the sequestering of this plutonium and any spent fuel under international controls, in addition to the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing plant under international inspection. This would be the "first step" in a continuing process that would lead to denuclearization in stages, keyed to progress

toward improved relations with the United States. The dismantlement of "all" nuclear weapons-related programs, period of the freeze, and the nature and timing of these measures for unspecified measures to subsequent stages, have not been specified. begin dismantlement within the preparatory period.

Among the U.S. quid pro quos suggested by North Korea for the shutdown of the reactor and reprocessing plant are the resumption of shipments and energy aid sufficient to compensate for the 2000 megawatts of electric power capacity promised in the Agreed Framework. But it would not require North Korea to acknowledge or reveal its suspected weapons-grade uranium capabilities during the preparatory phase.

The North Korean Proposal significantly, the South Korean proposal would not restrict energy aid to non-nuclear energy programs, as the U.S. proposal does, thus leaving the door open for a continuation of the suspended Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) program to build the two

The U.S. and North Korean proposals both call for a freeze of the production of new weaponsusable plutonium during the initial preparatory phase of the denuclearization process. But the U.S. proposal goes beyond a freeze during a three-month preparatory period. It provides for the sequestering of existing plutonium under international controls but, more important, for the "supervised disablement" of all North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons components, including any centrifuge facilities related to the suspected weapons-grade enrichment program.

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By contrast, the South Korean proposal allows a preparatory period of six months, not three months, that would be limited to a freeze, without additional "disablement" proviso. Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo Hyuck outlined six steps in an unpublished "Concept Paper" presented at the start of negotiations on June 24:

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Like the U.S. proposal, it calls for a North Korean pledge, prior to the start of the freeze, Korea and the other parties in the Beijing

Negotiations would negotiate an agreement providing for a six month freeze of its nuclear programs. During this six month period, it would "declare all of its nuclear programs, cease operation of these programs, seal nuclear materials and facilities and put them under international verification." The dismantlement would begin "within the six months of the freeze."

3. At the beginning of the freeze, the other parties would give North Korea security assurances, affirming that they "have no intention to attack, invade or seek regime change," and that they would provide "more enduring" assurances once the dismantlement is completed.

4. During the freeze period, the other parties would provide heavy fuel oil and increased humanitarian assistance to North Korea and would "launch a study project to determine its energy requirements."

5. The United States and North Korea would begin a dialogue "soon" on terrorism and economic sanctions "for the purpose of eventually lifting the sanctions."

6. The parties would agree to "make efforts to remove obstacles on the way toward normalization of diplomatic relations and significantly improve the environment for economic cooperation between North Korea and the international community."

The South Korean Proposal

The Task Force believes that the South Korean proposal offers a realistic basis for successfully pursuing renewed negotiations with North Korea. As a minimum objective, the new Administration should seek to initiate a denuclearization process based on South Korean proposal that would start with a freeze

At the same time, the group believes that greater recognition should be given to the urgency of the threat posed by North Korea's possession of significant quantities of weapons-usable plutonium that could be transferred to third parties. The group urges the adoption of a more ambitious, sharply-focused strategy designed to achieve the complete removal of all of this plutonium from North Korea in the first phase of denuclearization. The achievement of this goal, which would greatly enhance U.S. security, was deferred in the Agreed Framework until the final phase of the process.

In order to get North Korea to take the extraordinary step of giving up its plutonium, the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia should be prepared to offer significant economic and political incentives going beyond the unspecified amount of heavy fuel oil and "increased humanitarian assistance" that would be provided under the South Korean freeze proposal.

The group proposes a phased, four-step process, detailed below, that would lead to complete denuclearization, including the dismantlement of any weapons-grade uranium enrichment facilities.

Preparatory Phase

The four-step proposal would be presented in full at the outset of negotiations. However, the steps would be negotiated one at a time. Before negotiating on Step One, the United States and North Korea would join in a Declaration of Denuclearization.

North Korea would commit itself to the goal of ~~the~~ *during the period of transition to complete complete elimination of its "nuclear weapons denuclearization proposed in Steps Two, Three and programs," including all fissile material in whatever* ~~Four.~~

form. If North Korea is unwilling to accept more explicit language that specifically refers to weapons ~~Following the exchange of conditional security grade enrichment facilities, the United States, along~~ *assurances, negotiations would begin on Step One. with the others in the six-party talks, would make* ~~Recommendations publicly clear their understanding that such facilities are covered.~~ *Step One:*

The United States would declare its respect for North ~~Eliminating the Post-1994 North Korean Plutonium Korean sovereignty and commit itself in the~~ *Inventory Declaration to the goal of normalized relations and a tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War (th* ~~The extent of the plutonium already reprocessed by United States, South Korea and North Korea.)~~ *North Korea both before the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in 1994 and subsequent to its breakdown* *Each side would provide the other with an explicit* ~~2002 is a subject of dispute among nuclear conditional security assurance. The United States~~ *scientists and intelligence agencies. However, there is would pledge not to initiate a military attack against* ~~general consensus that the total amount of weapons-~~ *North Korea or to seek to undermine its government's* ~~able plutonium in North Korea's possession does This pledge would remain effective both during~~ *not exceed 40 kilograms, i.e. enough for five, or at negotiations on the four steps and thereafter, provided* ~~most, six fission -type (as distinct from fusion) that North Korea abides by the terms of the~~ *nuclear weapons, depending on the grade of agreements negotiated.* *plutonium, the weapon design and the desired explosive yield.*

North Korea would pledge not to initiate a military attack against the United States. This pledge would ~~Step One would deal with what is by far the largest remain effective both during negotiations on the fo~~ *portion of this accumulation, the plutonium steps and thereafter, provided that the United States* ~~reprocessed since the breakdown of the Agreed abides by the terms of the agreements negotiated. In~~ *framework in December, 2002. In addition, North Korea would reaffirm its 199* ~~North Korea would be required to permit the commitment not to attack South Korea, and would~~ *inspection access necessary for the IAEA to pledge not to transfer fissile material to third parties* ~~to determine how much plutonium has been reprocessed under any circumstances, with immediate effect~~ *from the 8,000 fuel rods; the*

sequestering of this plutonium and any spent fuel offered in payment per kilogram. However, it notes under international controls, and the that South Korea and Japan had agreed to provide \$4 shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing billion and \$1 billion respectively to construct light plant under international controls. water reactors under the 1994 Agreed Framework, Based upon the quantum of the post-1994 plutonium and that the United States did spend \$405,106,000 stockpile, the United States, Japan, from 1995 through 2003 for oil shipments and South Korea, China and Russia would provide administrative support of KEDO in return for the substantial economic and political incentives freeze.)

to North Korea if it is willing to surrender all of this North Korea would decide on the priorities in this plutonium for disposal out of the country: assistance package. As examples of the assistance

First, the resumption of shipments of the 500,000 tons of oil per year promised in the programs envisaged by the Task Force, such aid could relate to:

Agreed Framework, which were cut off in December 2002. Long-term food security
Irrigation and agricultural modernization
Short-term energy security, including continued heavy oil shipments and the integration

Second, the establishment of liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington, and Pyongyang of the North Korean electricity grid with South and Tokyo, as the first step toward fully normalized Korean and/ or Chinese and relations. Russian electricity networks
Long-term energy security, including oil and gas prospecting and natural gas pipeline links with Russia

Third, based on the quantum of the stockpile surrendered, the five parties would compensate North Korea with substantial bilateral and health facilities
Rehabilitation of hospitals, clinics, and other public multilateral programs of assistance for its Modernization of the economic infrastructure, including harbors, ports, railroads and the electrical grid
accordance with an agreed price

per kilogram. For example, assuming 40 kilograms at \$25 million per kilogram, the funds available for these programs would be \$1 billion. An agreement fixing the valuation of the aid package, No timetable for resumption of the direct cash payments to North Korea oil shipments and their duration, and the establishment of liaison offices would be established prior to the surrender of the plutonium by North Korea.

(The Task Force does not specify how much would Korea.

North Korea would make a formal pledge in that of it. agreement not to transfer any fissile material out of North Korea pending the implementation of a significant proposal considered seriously but not Steps One, Two, Three and Four, adopted by the Task Force would be to and would initiate steps to rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and permit the resumption of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection access. offer cash payment for the plutonium surrendered on a sliding scale, with the compensation per kilogram increasing in accordance with the amount surrendered, as an incentive to North Korea to offer as much up front as possible.

The specific content of the aid package, the valuation of specific programs and how they would be administered would be negotiated subsequently with North Korea. In the case of energy aid, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would be a possible conduit for external funds and the administrator agreed programs. No funds would be made available directly to North Korea to avoid possible diversion to military purposes. The destination of the plutonium for storage or destruction would be decided by the five parties. Russia would be a possibility, given the U.S. involvement in monitoring Russian nuclear facilities as part of the Nunn-Lugar program.

Supporters of this proposal cited a precedent in the 1994 deal with Russia in which the United States agreed to pay Moscow \$10 billion to convert 500 tons of high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium for use in U.S. light water reactors. Many members objected that cash payments could be diverted to military purposes. In another version of this proposal, the funds generated would be used for aid programs on the same basis as in the Step One proposal above that the Task Force did adopt. Although the group did not reach a consensus in support of either version of the "buyout" approach, the Task Force recommends that it be given consideration in the event of an impasse with Pyongyang.

Step Two:

* * * * *

Plutonium Cleanout

If the incentives are sufficient and are responsive to North Korea's priorities as it defines them, the Task Force believes that Pyongyang may prove willing to surrender all of the post-1994 plutonium in Step One. However, the United States should consider a fallback position in the event that North Korea should balk at giving up its accumulated in the five megawatt reactor at North Korea would agree to eliminate the remainder of its plutonium inventory not covered in Step One. This would include plutonium reprocessed prior to the Agreed Framework; additional plutonium contained in unprocessed fuel rods that

Yongbyon since the breakdown of the Agreed Framework; any other plutonium in unprocessed fuel rods from previous reactor operations, and eliminating the Plutonium Nuclear Weapons plutonium that exists in any other potentially weapons-usable form.

This step requires very stringent and intrusive monitoring and on-site inspection and, therefore, for safety reasons, it would be desirable to have North Korea reprocess the fuel rods under international inspection and surrender the plutonium for shipment by the United States, rather than have the fuel rods themselves shipped. Compensation would be provided for this plutonium on the same basis as in Step One and the five parties to the accord would share the cost of reprocessing.

This step requires very stringent and intrusive

monitoring and on-site inspection and, therefore, must have full cooperation from North Korea. The five parties would jointly fund the safe, secure, and environmentally acceptable elimination of the North Korean plutonium infrastructure. The elimination of the infrastructure would be conducted under IAEA inspection and be open to future on-site international monitoring.

David Albright, president of the Institute of Science

and International Security and a Task Force member, has made detailed proposals for appropriate verification that the Task Force endorsed (http://www.isisonline.org/dprkverification.html). To reciprocate for North Korea's cooperation in Step Three, especially for opening previously-barred waste and storage sites to a level of inspection acceptable to the IAEA, the United States would take two steps. First, it would initiate talks with North Korea to set the stage for the elevation of its liaison office in Pyongyang to the status of an Embassy. Second, it would declare its readiness to keep open the option of completing one or both of the two light water reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, by supporting action in KEDO that would continue the suspension of the reactor

In tandem with North Korea's verifiable fulfillment of its obligations under Step Two, the United States would reciprocate in two ways. First, it would end remaining economic sanctions against Pyongyang. Second, it would encourage the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to move toward North Korean membership in the institutions. This would require the removal of North Korea from the U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

project, in place of the previous U.S. efforts to cancel it.

Upon the completion of Step Three, North Korea would have fulfilled many of the same obligations it accepted under the Agreed Framework

which provided for dismantlement

of its plutonium infrastructure. The United States, South Korea and Japan, however,

would not have completed the construction of the two light water reactors for North

Korea, which had been envisaged in return for freezing its nuclear plutonium program.

South Korea has spent \$800 million on preparing the site for the two reactors at Kumho, and

South Korean companies have been awarded \$2.5 billion in contracts for completion of the

project. Japan has spent \$400 million. Construction work was suspended by KEDO

until December 1, 2004, when the future of the project was scheduled to be reviewed.

The Task Force recommends that KEDO should continue to suspend, not discontinue,

the reactor project, so that it can be periodically reassessed in the context of progress in the

denuclearization process and of changes in North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-South

Korea relations. Meanwhile, to make use of the infrastructure already developed at the

Kumho site, a non-nuclear thermal power plant could be built there. When and if a light

water reactor is built, external assistance should be provided only if North Korea agrees

to conditions that would preclude its use for nuclear weapons. These conditions would

include a commitment to lease its nuclear fuel from

commercial nuclear suppliers and to rule out capabilities for plutonium reprocessing and uranium

enrichment to weapons-grade.

For Pyongyang, getting at least one of the reactors up and running is a political priority, if

only because the Agreed Framework bore the personal imprint of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong

Il. Equally important, since Japan and South Korea both have large civilian nuclear programs,

North Korea regards nuclear power as a technological status symbol. Like Tokyo and

Seoul, Pyongyang wants nuclear power in its energy mix to reduce dependence on petroleum.

Still another factor is that North Korea has a force of 7,500 nuclear personnel, many of

them trained in Russia, who have been in a state of limbo since the 1994 accord and are

awaiting new jobs when the KEDO nuclear complex

at Kumho is completed.

Step Four:

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Uranium Enrichment

If North Korea does possess weapons-grade uranium enrichment facilities, they will not be

taken up lightly. The United States should be prepared to make its own most important concessions

in return for definitive North Korean action to resolve this issue. If North Korea permits the full, unimpeded

inspection access necessary to determine what, if any, long-term monitoring/ verification weaponsgrade enrichment facilities exist, and takes the regime designed to provide the transparency and comprehensive measures necessary to eliminate any cooperation required to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and weapons activities such facilities, the United States would take these steps:

First, the liaison offices established under Step One would be replaced by an Embassy and the establishment of full diplomatic relations. It would require trust and full cooperation from the host country. Such trust will exist at this stage, most members of the Task Force agree, if all of the U.S. compensatory measures recommended in Steps One through Four have been taken.

Second, the United States would authorize Exxon-Mobil to explore with North Korea, South Korea, Russia and international aid institutions the development of a natural gas pipeline that would originate in the Exxon-Mobil Sakhalin-I concession in Russia and would cross North Korea enroute to its principal market in South Korea. The Sakhalin pipeline would have a profound economic impact on North Korea, since Pyongyang would receive substantial annual transit fees and could rely on U.S. territory. Similarly, Japan and South Korea would find it easier to negotiate agreements with Pyongyang that would head off the escalating competitive development of short-range and medium-range missiles. The Clinton Administration made significant progress toward negotiating an agreement to end Pyongyang's missile exports and long-range missile development. These negotiations should be resumed on the basis of the recommendations

Finally, the United States would open negotiations with North Korea and South Korea on a tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War, which Pyongyang regards as an inseparable accompaniment to a meaningful normalization of relations. These steps would be taken side by side with North Korean actions to share its records and open up any related facilities not yet inspected for intrusive inspection. Together, North Korea, the United States and the IAEA would design the importance of the Additional Protocol, with its

newly-stringent inspection requirements, Additional Protocol. The Task Force emphasizes that was graphically demonstrated by the revelations North Korea, too, will have to be September, 2004, that South brought under the discipline of the Additional Korea had conducted secret experiments relating Protocol, but not until the final stages of the uranium enrichment and plutonium denuclearization process. reprocessing, some as recently as four years ago. It South Korea accepts full transparency as part of a was South Korea's decision to become South Korea's broader pattern of normal relations with one of the first states to accept the Additional Protocol, that led to these revelations. the international community. North Korea can be held The fact that Seoul had conducted a short-lived cover-up of the same standard only when its plutonium-based nuclear relations with the international community are weapons program during the Park Chung Hee's normalized in conjunction with the denuclearization military regime has long been known. Since process. the termination of this program under U.S. pressure Beyond the Nuclear Issue While focusing on the in 1975, South Korea has been a trusted adherent of the global non-proliferation regime. The nuclear crisis, the Task Force notes that significant recent revelations of secret experiments, economic reforms have been initiated in North Korea in violation of the 1991 North-South Agreement and since its last report. The group emphasized that the of IAEA commitments, suggest continuation of the reform process would gradually that latent support for a nuclear weapons option chosen up North Korea's rigid, totalitarian system, persists within the South Korean setting in motion a long-term process of political nuclear establishment. However limited the liberalization in which human rights abuses would be experiments were, they have vitiated confidence reduced. in South Korea's non-proliferation bona fides both in North Korea and in the broader international community, and have underscored the inseparability of non-proliferation enforcement efforts embracing North Korea and South Korea alike. Against this background, economic assistance and the normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang, including a peace treaty, would not only be critical to a resolution of the nuclear crisis but would also promote peaceful, evolutionary progress toward a more open society in North Korea. Policies South Korea is to be commended for its decision designed to pressure and isolate the Kim Jong Il make a clean breast of its failure to live up to all of its IAEA obligations and for its continuing commitments opposed to reform and would reinforce cooperation with enforcement of the repression.

James E. Goodby

troops from the Demilitarized Zone and reduce its forces.

I support the main thrust of the Task Force report.

However, a better approach than seeking a formal agreement at the outset would be to agree on a

statement of common goals and to adopt the model

Bush administration relied on to eliminate Libya's

nuclear programs. The administration has favorably

cited this model as a basis for making diplomatic

progress in North Korea.

the United States would:
1) reduce its deployment of troops on the Korean Peninsula, as it is now doing;

2) provide security assurances;

3) eliminate remaining trade barriers; normalize

diplomatic relations with North Korea; 4) provide

energy and economic aid.

The essence of the Libya model is to proceed through

"reciprocal unilateral measures"-independent

actions taken by parties to the negotiations to reach

their shared objectives. A formal agreement

is not a requirement. This process leaves to each

participant some discretion in what it actually

does. It is the model the Bush administration preferred

in the case of Russia, as well as Libya. North Korea's

nuclear programs are more advanced than Libya's and

piecemeal dismantlement may be the only practical

way to proceed.

South Korea would: 1) implement the economic

assistance it has promised to North Korea for ending

its nuclear programs; 2) initiate confidence- building

measures to lower tensions on

the peninsula.

Japan would: 1) provide North Korea with promised

reparations; 2) take actions to foster economic

development in North Korea. China and Russia could

undertake additional

measures in response to North Korea's decision to

dismantle its nuclear facilities.

What reciprocal unilateral measures might be

involved? The discussions in the six-party talks

suggest the following steps, over time:

If a denuclearized Korean Peninsula is accepted as a

common strategic objective, Kim Jong Il should be able

to begin the process by taking some significant action,

while reciprocal unilateral actions by other

participants would keep the ball rolling toward

achievement of the goal. By forming a permanent

oversight group at the earliest possible date, the

parties would maintain pressure and help build

momentum for the negotiations.

North Korea would:

1) dismantle all its nuclear facilities and place constraints on its missile programs, agreeing to

monitoring measures;

2) acknowledge and end all technical programs that could be used to enrich uranium; 3) withdraw

3) withdraw

James F. Grant

I support the Task Force's recommendations for negotiations as a way to further probe and test Pyongyang's intentions. However, this paper and its proposed negotiating strategy are based on the assumption, which I question, that North Korea can be convinced to negotiate in earnest concerning its nuclear weapons capability at this time if we approach them in a reassuring manner, and provide them with sufficient material incentives and security pledges.

progress in getting North Korea to agree to conditions related to non-proliferation/ non-export of weapons of mass destruction, I think we need to be prepared for an extended period without clear resolution of the fundamental issue of North Korean possession of a nuclear weapons capability. Katharine H.S. Moon Regarding Step One, I firmly agree that the United States and the four other parties to the

I do not believe that Pyongyang presently is willing to negotiate away a nuclear "posture" (declaratory or real) that has given them their only real leverage in dealing with the outside world and provides them with the possibility of a "poison pill" that in their mind might ward off invasion by the US and others. My assessment is that North Korean leaders will continue to present us with a "neither confirm nor deny" stance" concerning their nuclear posture.

six-party process must be ready and willing to offer significant economic and humanitarian assistance in recognition of and response to North Korea's steps to relinquish its post-1994 stockpile of plutonium. However, I object to the price per/ kilogram of plutonium scheme that would match assistance funds for the plutonium surrendered for the following reasons:

1. It could be construed by North Korea as an opportunity to haggle, stretch out the bargaining process, and engage in tit-for-tat tactics.

They may make some small tactical moves to gain some material benefits and split the forces arrayed against them. However, ultimately I believe they will frustrate our efforts and avoid clear resolution of the issue any time in the foreseeable future.

2. It would set an undesirable precedent for other states with active nuclear ambitions.
3. It would be subject to severe criticism within the U.S. public that North Korea's violation of the Agreed Framework is being rewarded systematically, and therefore would not be politically viable.

Notes of Dissent

We need to continue to search for ways to engage North Korea in serious negotiations, while maintaining a strong military posture in North East Asia as well. While we might conceivably make

4. It would conflate and confuse payment for illicit goods with economic assistance that meets real human needs, such as those mentioned on page 15.
5. For the same reasons, I object to the

explicit buyout suggestions.

Ambassador Donald P. Gregg and Joel S. WiCorps in South Korea for five years and has visited endorsed this statement.

1985 and a leading U.S. supporter of South Korean human rights organizations. He served with the Peace Corps in South Korea for five years and has visited North Korea.

Amb. Charles L. Pritchard

I join with Katharine Moon's Note of Dissent in objecting to an explicit monetary buy out of North Korea's post-1994 stockpile of plutonium.

The Task Force on U.S.-Korea Policy Members

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DAVID ALBRIGHT, President of the Institute for Science and International Security, is the author of *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle*. As a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency Action Team from 1992 to 1997, he served as the first non-governmental inspector of the Iraq nuclear program.

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Technologies, served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J-2), U.S. Forces, South Korea, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (C-2) of the US-ROK

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AMBASSADOR DONALD P. GREGG, President of the Korea Society, served as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 1989 to 1993. He served in the

Central Intelligence Agency from 1951 to 1982 and subsequently in the White House as National Security Adviser to George H.W. Bush during his tenure as

Committee on Korean Studies of the Association for Asian Studies.

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Director of the Center for International Strategy and Policy at the Sam Nunn School of Georgia Institute of Technology. He formerly served as

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Bank. He has visited North Korea six times in Director of Target Planning for the Fifth Air Force connection with environmental and energy assistance

He is the author of Japan's Nuclear Option.

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variety of senior arms control positions during 3 years in the Foreign Service, including Vice Chairman

AMBASSADOR JAMES T. LANEY served as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 1993 to of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). As Chief U.S. Negotiator for the Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, he

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HAN S. PARK, is University Professor of International Affairs and director of the Center for Global Issues at University of Georgia. He has visited North Korea 40 times and has organized numerous high level "track two" exchanges, bringing together North Korean officials with retired U.S. officials and members of Congress.

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AMBASSADOR CHARLES L. PRITCHARD, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, has served as U.S. Ambassador and Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea and as Senior Director for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council. He is the author of The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Beyond.

KENNETH QUINONES, author of Understanding North Korea, served for 18 years in a variety of U.S. Foreign Service assignments relating to Northeast Asia, including Desk Officer for North Korea in the State Department. He lived and worked at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center in North Korea for eight months between 1995 and 1998 as a member of the U.S. Nuclear Spent Fuel Team that monitored the 1994 nuclear freeze with North Korea.

LEON V. SIGAL is Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project of the Social Science Research Council. His book, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea, won the 1998 book award of the American Academy of Diplomacy. He served on the editorial board of The New York Times and was a professor of government at Wesleyan University.

JOHN D. STEINBRUNER is Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. He is Chairman of the Board of the Arms Control Association and served as Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution for 18 years. He is the author of Principles of Global Security and co-author with William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter of A New Concept of Cooperative Security.

DAVID I. STEINBERG is a Distinguished Professor and Director of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He served as Representative of the Asia Foundation in South Korea from 1963 to 1968 and 1994 to 1997. his 12 books

include *Stone Mirror: Reflections on Contemporary Korea*; *The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation and Social Change and Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics*.

Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics.

Notes

1. *Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers and New*

JOEL S. WIT, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is co-author with Robert L. Gallucci and Daniel Poneman of *Going*

Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. During 15 years in the State Department he served in a variety of arms control and non-proliferation assignments, including Senior Advisor to Ambassador Gallucci during negotiations on the 1994 Agreed Framework and subsequently as Coordinator for implementation of the agreement.

2. Siegfried S. Hecker, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 21, 2004

3. For the most authoritative publicly available discussions of the intelligence findings related to North Korea's suspected weapons-grade uranium enrichment facility, see *North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, January, 2004, and Jonathan Pollack, "The United States, North Korea and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review*, Summer, 2003

4. "Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs," *Statement by James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 15, 2004

5. *The Financial Times*, May 4, 2004, pp. 1 and 3.

6. South Korea signed the Additional Protocol on June 21, 1999.

MEREDITH WOO-CUMINGS is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Her works include *Race to the Swift: The State and*

Finance in Korean Development and The Developmental State. She is a consultant to the Asian Development Bank Institute and served on the White House Commission on U.S.-Asia Pacific Trade.

The Model Additional Protocol requires states to declare to the IAEA a number of nuclear and nuclear-related materials, and activities that, while they could be part of a peaceful nuclear program, would be

required for a covert nuclear weapons program. (U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol, Susan F. Burk, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, Acting, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C., January 29, 2004)

Specifically, the Protocol requires states to report exports of nuclear-related items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, confirm imports of such items, and report domestic manufacturing of key items. It also requires states to report exports, imports, and stockpiles of raw uranium and thorium that could be used as feed material for a covert nuclear program, and also report information related to uranium mines, uranium and thorium concentration camps, uses of buildings on the sites of safeguarded nuclear facilities, construction of new nuclear facilities, and certain nuclear-related research and development work involving nuclear material..."

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